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According to Teece (2010) a business model describes the way in which a firm 'delivers value to customers, entices it's customers to pay for value, and converts those payments to profit' (Teece, 2010: 172) . A good business model means that a product offers value propositions that are compelling for customers, provide an advantageous infrastructure for the enterprise and generate a substantial revenue stream. An inappropriate business model means that a product will either fail to deliver value or fail to capture it. In this chapter, we do not enter into the debate about what constitutes a business model, but simply make use of the term to highlight the fact that, in order to extract value from a technology, some way to exploit it must to be found.
Business model innovation
Although a good business model is required for short-term commercial success, it does not guarantee long-term competitive advantage. As Teece notes,'... in practice, successful business models very often become, to some degree, 'shared' by multiple competitors' (Teece, 2010, 179) . In order for a business model to continue to provide an advantage it must be clearly differentiated from others and difficult to imitate. The process by which such models are created has become known as business model innovation. The term was first popularized by Coles (2003 and and is built on earlier notions of 'disruptive technologies' (Bower and Christensen, 1995) and 'disruptive innovations' (Christensen, 1997) .
A disruptive technology (Bower and Christensen, 1995 ) is a technology that disrupts an existing market by introducing a novel, and sometimes unlooked for, value proposition. At first, such technologies appear limited and only able to satisfy the needs of a particular niche market where the dimensions of performance at 4 which they excel are valued. For the companies that serve mainstream markets, such technologies are perceived as irrelevant and, at least initially, ignored.
However, over time, advances are made and the performance of the new technology improves until it reaches a point where it can satisfy the requirements of the mainstream market. At this point, the incumbent firms find they are unable to catch up with the conceptual and technological lead built up by those who focused on the disruptive technology and lose their position as market leaders.
Later Christensen broadened this idea to encompass innovation in general rather than specific technologies. He notes that: (Christensen, 1997: 15) Mitchell and Coles (2003 and 2004) applied these ideas to business models and argued that similar advantages could be achieved by replacing an old business model with a new model that would leave competitors 'out of position and unable to respond effectively' (Mitchell and Coles, 2003: 15 (Markides, 2006: 20) Thus, the advantage gained by business model innovation is the way in which it allows the same basic product to be offered in a new way that yields more profit than a competitor could achieve using the current business model. London and Hart (2004) (London and Hart, 2004: 354) They argue that by adopting this strategy companies miss out on the potentially huge returns from the poorer 'base of the pyramid' market. Christensen, Craig and Hart (2001) (Christensen, Craig and Hart, 2001: 92) Most studies that look specifically at business model innovation in emerging markets focus on how firms from established economies adjust their business models to work in emerging markets. There appear to be very few studies that look directly at business models that have been developed within emerging markets. By ignoring developments in 'base of the pyramid' markets, we argue, companies also cut themselves off from a potential source of innovation and new ideas. place at a number of levels. However, the companies they studied were those that had already been identified as having 'succeeded in serving customers living in poverty' (Anderson and Markides , 2007: 28) . In practice, most were local subsidiaries of multinational companies that had overcome the problems of the affordability, acceptability, availability and awareness of their products in these markets. Hart and Christensen (2002) is one of the first papers to draw attention explicitly to the value of business models that originate in emerging markets.
Business model innovation and emerging markets
Citing examples such as the Japanese firm Honda's success in selling low cost motorcycles to the US in the 1960's and the Chinese firm Calanz's success in selling low cost microwave cookers to Chinese consumers they note, '... business models that are forged in low-income markets travel well; that is, they can be profitably applied in more places than models defined in high income markets'. (Hart and Christensen, 2002: 52) Sánchez and Ricart (2010) have conducted one of the few recent studies directed specifically at the business models used in 'base of the pyramid' markets.
They analyzed the business models used by seven companies that operate in lowincome markets and evaluated their success. However, once again, most of the firms were companies that had originated elsewhere; only a few of the firms were based in the countries in which those markets exist.
Summary
To summarize, environmental and geopolitical pressures have provided the driving force behind the search for alternative sources of motive power. In technological terms, firms from Europe and North America are probably leading the race, but firms from emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India and China are actively pursuing the same goal. However, although mastery of the technology is important, it is not the sole criterion of success as, 'The economic value of a technology remains latent until it is commercialized in some way via a business model' (Chesbrough, 2010: 354) . Although business models from emerging economies have not been the focus of many studies, we believe there are two reasons why an improved understanding of these models might be of value.
Firstly, the pressures that drive the search for alternative sources of motive power globally have been brought into particular focus by the growing pace of industrial development in the emerging economies. Thus, for a solution to be 8 effective, it must be acceptable in, and applicable to, emerging as well as developed economies. As we have seen (Anderson and Markides, 2007; Sánchez and Ricart, 2010 ), a business model does not have to be developed in an emerging economy to be successful, however, as we have argued previously (Wang and Kimble, 2011) , the likelihood of success will be greater if it is.
Secondly, the use of the gasoline powered automobile, at least in Europe and America, is well established and the problems of breaking our 'dependency' on the car has long been a topic of debate (Newman et al., 1995) . There is anecdotal evidence from studies (Hart and Christensen, 2002 ) that business models developed in emerging economies have the potential to be disruptive in a similar fashion to Bower and Christensen's original notion of disruptive technologies (Bower and Christensen, 1995) . It is possible that a novel business model, from an emerging economy or elsewhere, could be sufficiently disruptive to provide a solution to Europe and America's fascination with the internal combustion engine.
The next section briefly reviews the move towards new-energy vehicles in China and then looks at a case study of a company that produced a specific form of new-energy vehicle, the low speed electric vehicles (LSEV). The case study is of particular interest as it contains many of the features associated with disruptive technologies and business models.
E-MOBILITY IN CHINA
The electric vehicle industry, sometimes termed the e-mobility industry, began to develop in China in the early 1990s. In addition to electric cars, LSEV includes electric bikes, electric scooters and electric motorcycles. E-bikes are simple bicycles with an electric motor with an average speed of 20 km/h. E-scooters and e-motorcycles are equipped with heavier motors (1-5 kW) and have speeds of between 40-80 km/h. Production of two-wheeled e-vehicles grew to 25 million units in 2010 and production volumes are expected to reach 35 million in 2015.
However, despite the high volume of production, the industry is still at an early stage of growth. Currently the sector consists of around 2700 licensed producers.
The market share of the top 50 companies is only around 50 per cent, much lower than a mature industry.
With 140 million users of e-bicycles, e-scooters and e-motorcycles, e-mobility solutions are widely accepted by Chinese consumers as the answer to their basic transportation needs. Ninety percent of the total production of e-bikes is for the domestic market. The acceptance of low-speed electric transport forms the base for a potential market for the LSEVs that we will describe shortly. In addition to these consumers, there were 500 million users of standard bicycles in 2009. Over time, it is expected that a significant number of these will move to e-bicycles, e-scooters or e-motorcycles and that some, together with a proportion of the 140 million current e-mobility users, will switch directly to LSEVs. Based on the modest assumption of five per cent of bicycle and current e-mobility users switching to LSEVs, the market for LSEVs in China would amount to around 32 million people.
Defining the low-speed electric vehicle
There is currently no international consensus concerning the definition of a LSEV and even in China, one of the leading producers of LSEVs, the LSEV is not officially recognized as a road vehicle. Below we describe the key features of a LSEV in China together with a brief outline of how the LSEV is viewed in the United States and in Europe.
China
The typical LSEV is composed of an accelerator, brakes, steering wheel and a lead acid battery pack. Gearshifts, air-conditioning and safety equipment are omitted to reduce the total costs. The electric motor is connected directly to the speed controller and most models do not have a sophisticated battery management or motor control system. A typical LSEV has a top speed of between 40 and 70 km/h, the dimensions of a compact car and weigh less than 1100 kg. The lead acid battery can be recharged from a 220 volt home electric outlet and has a capacity of 120-250 Ah, giving a cruising distance of 80 km, 100 km or 150 km, depending on the number of battery packs. 
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION: THE SHIFENG GROUP
Below we present a case study of the Shifeng Group, one of the largest producers of LSEVs in China. This case study is of particular interest as an illustration of the role of the business model and business model innovation. Firstly, in terms of business models, it is an example of a product that is still in the process of being defined: the technology for the product exists but an appropriate means of commercializing it does not. Secondly, in terms of business model innovation, it also illustrates a market for a product that corresponds closely to Christensen's notion of a disruptive technology and has grown, so far, without the support of central government and outside the boundaries of the mainstream automobile industry.
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Background
The Shifeng (Group) Co., Ltd. is state owned enterprise, which operates under the jurisdiction of the regional government of Shandong Province. It was established in 1993 and began the production of low-speed, three-wheeled, diesel powered, light trucks. Although low-speed three-wheeled trucks are its core business, amounting to a total production of 1.25 million vehicles, since 2008, Shifeng has become one of the key players in developing the market for LSEVs. The group's sales revenue in 2010 was 23.6 billion ¥ ($3.6 billion) and the cumulative sales of their lowspeed three and four-wheel vehicles has reached over seven million units. Shifeng is still lead by its founder, Mr. Liu Yifa, although his son, Liu Cheng Qiang, became the firm's General Manager in 1999. Further information on the history and background of this case study can be found elsewhere (Wang and Kimble, 2011) .
Methodology
Broadly speaking, the methodology we employed is that of a descriptive case study (Yin, 2003) . However, the methodology departs from the comparative or iterative approach described by Yin (2003) and Eisenhardt (1989) in that the analysis is, in part, a re-analysis of data collected in earlier case studies and, in part, the analysis of data that has been collected more recently. It also departs from the strict view of a descriptive case study, where the researcher sets out to explore cause-effect relationships using a set of propositions derived from existing theory, as some areas of existing theory, such as business models and business model innovation, were not sufficiently developed. Consequently, our approach to the case study is 14 also exploratory, as the use of these concepts, particularly within emerging economies, is not well developed.
The first contact with the company dates back to PhD research in 2001 (Wang, 2002) . In 2008, just after the first LSEVs had been produced, the president of the 
Building a business model for LSEVs
Currently, the main market for LSEVs in China is in rural areas. More than 70 per cent of the population of China, around 900 million people, live in such areas; however, their purchasing power is much lower than those who live in the cities.
Consequently, the business model for LSEVs that has evolved has, so far, been aimed at servicing the needs of these consumers.
According to the China Statistical Yearbook (2010), the per capita annual income of rural households was 5153 ¥ ($790), compared to 17,175 ¥ ($2650) for urban households, giving rural consumers an income of less than a third of those who live in urban areas. Khan and Riskin (1998) found an increasing disparity between urban and rural areas between 1988 and 1995 while Yang and Hao (1999) show that this disparity has been growing since the opening up of the Chinese economy in the 1980s. Ranis, (1988: 74) describes this as a dual economy where 'two sectors which are basically asymmetrical -and thus dualistic -in terms of both product and organisational characteristics' co-exist.
The dual-structure of the Chinese economy is key factor in the development of the business model for LSEVs. At 25,000 ¥ ($3900), the purchase price of a LSEV is around one and half year's income for a family in a rural area, much more affordable that a small traditionally powered car. The attraction of a LSEV lies not only with its low price, but also with its low running costs. The cost of the electricity needed to travel 100 km is around 6 ¥ ($0.9); for a small gasoline powered car the cost for the same distance would be 49 ¥ ($7.5), or eight times higher.
The battery can be charged overnight from an ordinary 220 volt outlet.
Households in rural areas have private parking spaces where vehicles can be recharged, which is more convenient than gasoline-powered vehicles as the petrol station network in such areas is not well developed. The cost of the battery is reduced through a system of recycling. The cost of a battery (about 4000 ¥ / $600) is included in the initial purchase price of the LSEV. The battery can be used for one or two years, depending on the distances travelled, after which consumers pay around 2000 ¥ ($300) for a replacement. The used battery is then processed, recycled and reused.
While the LSEV has a clear value proposition to (low-income) consumers in rural areas, it also offers advantages to a segment of the more affluent urban market.
Since most urban commuting distances are less than 20 km and the top speed of a LSEV corresponds to the standard downtown speed limit of 50 km/h, it could also answer the basic daily transportation needs of many urban consumers who currently use electric bicycles, scooters and motorcycles. It has also been suggested that the simplicity of LSEVs, where the driver need only learn to accelerate, break and to drive forwards and backwards, might prove attractive to other categories of 16 drivers, such as urban housewives and senior citizens, who may feel more comfortable driving such vehicles at a low speeds. However, while this urban market exists in theory, LSEVs are not recognized as road vehicles and changes to China's legislative framework are needed before this potential can be realized.
Building a market for LSEVs
The 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MAINSTREAM WESTERN CARMAKERS
In an earlier paper (Wang and Kimble, 2011) Clearly, the direct competitive impact that the development of the LSEV in China would have elsewhere will depend on which of these scenarios is followed, but regardless of this, the development of successful a 'LSEV Business Model', in China or elsewhere, could have profound implications for the existing automobile giants.
Looking first at the LSEV in China, because of its low price, low running costs and the ease of charging from a domestic 220 volt electric outlet, the LSEV offers a clear value proposition to low-income consumers, particularly those living in rural areas. It offers the basic utility of a car, the relatively short range is not a problem as most commuting distances are small and it can be charged overnight. In addition, the use of LSEVs does not require the construction of the specialist charging stations needed for standard EVs, which has acted as an inhibitor to their spread in both rural and urban areas. In addition, as we have noted, most Chinese consumers do not have the fixed notions of 'a vehicle' (i.e. a passenger car) or 'an electric vehicle' that the mainstream western consumers have, which may make this type of simple technology more easily accepted.
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Outside China, the potential of LSEVs appears more limited. The utility of a low-speed, short-distance, EV may seem obvious, but could it have the significant, or even revolutionary, implications alluded to in the earlier sections of this chapter?
Will the LSEV ever be more than a technically inferior product that serves the specific needs of a particular group of consumers in a niche market? The key question here is can the LSEV offer a similar value proposition to people outside of China.
Without entering into a analysis of the history of the automobile in Europe and America such as that offered by Calkins (2009) , it is safe to say that, for most western consumers, a passenger car is thought of as a long distance cruising vehicle that has the capacity of reaching relatively high speeds. The size of fuel tank, the power of the engine and a long history of use has led us to expect our cars to carry us for long distances at speeds in excess of 100 km/h. However, the reality is that most of people live in urban areas, are subjected to the speed limits of 50 km/h or less and travel under 50 km/day. Viewed as a simple matter of economics, this approach is a clear waste of resources for most urban users.
For LSEVs to offer an alternative there would have to be a change in the way we think about personal transport, a LSEV for urban usage and public transport or some other form of fuel-efficient vehicle for long distances; however this would raise a series of complex questions. These include questions of politics (Calkins, 2009 ), the social utility of car ownership (Steg et al., 2001) , the legacy of urban planning based around car use (Newman et al., 1995) and a growing environmental concern among consumers about dwindling natural resources and pollution (Goldemberg, 1998) .
While the LSEV is unlikely to provide the answer to all of these issues, it is clear that it offers many of the same advantages to western consumers as it does to those in China: simplicity, low cost and the removal of one of the main hurdles to 21 the spread of the EVs, charging stations. Thus, if the right business model can be found to commercialize this potential then the LSEV could prove to be disruptive in the sense that Mitchell and Coles use the term, placing competitors 'out of position and unable to respond effectively' (Mitchell and Coles, 2003: 15) .
Currently the LSEV is something of a curiosity: a product that in global terms is clearly inferior but that serves the needs of a specific geographical and social niche.
However, if the right business model can be found, then the LSEV also has the potential to be 'disruptive' in Bower and Christensen's (1995) sense of the term, currently only suitable for the needs of a niche market but with the capability of improving to the extent that it could meet the (changed) needs of a wider market.
